JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. A model of cooperation versus defection in a sequence of games is analysed under the assumptions that the rules of the game are randomly changed from one encounter to another, that the decisions are to be made each time anew, according to the (random) rules of the specific local game, and that the result of one such game affects the ability of a player to participate and thus, cooperate in the next game. Under plausible assumptions, it is shown that all Nash solutions of the supergame determine cooperation over a non-degenerate range of rules, determining encounters of the prisoner's dilemma type.
Introduction
In the one-shot prisoner's dilemma game described in Figure 1 , the only Nash equilibrium is (D, D) . This is the case also for any finite repetition of the one-shot game, a result which does not agree with experimental behavior as observed under similar circumstances (see Rapaport (1967) ). However, in the infinitely repeated one-shot game, any individually rational payoff is a Nash equilibrium (folk theorem) and this result is consistent with many cases of observed cooperation in real such encounters. Yet, one never sees infinite series of encounters. Another drawback is that (D, D) is always a Nash equilibrium which leaves the problem of the evolution of cooperative behavior open. To rationalize some measure of cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma, Radner (1980) applied the e-equilibrium concept to show that an outcome close to the cooperative one can be obtained. Kreps et al. (1982) explained the observed cooperation by incomplete information. Yet a different approach applied the concept of bounded rationality as implemented by various computing machines such as finite automata (Neyman (1985) , Rubinstein (1986) ) or Turing machines (Megiddo and Widgerson (1986) ). Concerning the second difficulty, Axelrod and Hamilton (1981) discussed the dynamics of a process through which a cooperative behavior can be established in an initially non-cooperative population.
It seems to us, though, that one cause of the inconsistency between theory and observation may be in the discrepancy between the mathematical model of a repetition of the same game and the real situation, in which there might be a continuity of different potential future encounters between the two potential players. Thus, a crucial factor in the establishment of a tendency to cooperate may be the positive probability that a present opponent, if then alive, will cooperate in future encounters, not because he will remember and return in kind for kindness (a 'strategy' which is, by itself, disadvantageous when rare) but because with some positive probability, the realization of the encounter parameters will be such that cooperation will be in its favor. If so, an individual can increase its long-term (supergame) welfare by increasing his opponent's survival probability even by choosing a strategy which is slightly unfavorable for the short-term encounter. This is indeed so, where the encounter payment function is survival probability (or at least 'survival' as a potential player). But then, by symmetry, the range of situations (encounter parameters) for which cooperation is advantageous increases, the probability of future cooperation increases and the process perpetuates itself to a limit, as we see.
In this work we consider, more specifically, a model in which the payment function of any next encounter is a random variable of a known (multidimensional) distribution. The relevant question regarding this more general assumption is not whether to cooperate or not but under what conditions (i.e., for what realization of the payment function) to cooperate. More specifically, the (pure) strategies of the game are measurable sets of 'situation' under which the player is bound to cooperate. We assume, further, that a failure in one encounter decreases a player's chance to participate (and, therefore, to cooperate, if he is willing) in the next encounter, if occurs. Thus non-cooperation, even when locally advantageous, may be disadvantageous from a viewpoint of the supergame which is defined as a sequence of encounters of a random length.
Under plausible assumptions it is shown that, except for some singular cases (to be determined), any Nash solution of the supergame determines cooperation over a nondegenerate set of situations (i.e., realizations of the payment function) of the prisoner's dilemma type. As it appears, the widely analysed case of repetition of the same encounter is one singular exception.
The motivation for this work stems from a biological (or sociobiological) context, in which individuals interact repeatedly under various conditions, the payment function of an encounter is the survival probability to the next encounter and the payment function of the supergame is the survival probability to the next generation. We are, therefore, interested also in some stronger, dynamic properties of the Nash solutions, namely, in evolutionary stability. For discussion of the evolutionary aspects of the reader is referred to Eshel and Weinshall (1987) .
The model and its basic properties
We start by defining a two-player symmetric supergame as a random-lengt of 'events' (to be defined below) to which each of the players is exposed, i perished in some previous event. We assume that at each moment ther probability p > 0 of some future event occurring, independently of past even two players are alive, an event becomes a symmetric 2 X 2 encounter, in player has two alternative strategies, say 'cooperate' or 'defect'. The We further assume that if only one of the players is present at th then his probability of surviving it is equal to the one he would ach cooperation, say X4, independently of the strategy. (With minor te though, most results of this work can be extended to the situation probability attains any value smaller than X,.) By choosing the term first strategy, however, we mean that (2. a) X,>X3 and X2>X4 (i.e., by cooperating, a player always helps his op xm + x3 (2. b) X4 < X 2 (i.e., mutual cooperation is always in the P (2.1c) X2 >X3 (i.e., if only one player defects, th opponent).
We assume a positive probability for encounters of the prisoner's dilemma type, i.e.:
(2.2) p(D) > 0 where D = {X IX2> XI > X4> X3}.
We also assume, however, a positive probability for encounters in which cooperation is of immediate self reward, i.e., (2.3) p(R)>O where R = {X I X, X2; X2 3 X4}.
We assume, moreover, that F has positive densityfover a convex set of parameter including at least part of the boundary (X I X = X2 > X3 = X4} between R and D.
At each stage of the supergame each player possesses full knowledge of the pre situation (i.e., about the realization a of X) as well as of the distribution F and the valu p. However, we assume no memory so that a pure strategy is a measurable set realizations of X (game-matrices a) over which the player is bound to cooperate mixed strategy is a measurable function F: Q -* [0, 1], determining the probability F(a that a player will cooperate in a given realization a E Q.
If player i (i = 1, 2) chooses the strategy F,, then the survival probability of player during a single encounter is
The survival probability of player 2 is, by symmetry;
(2.5) s2(rF, r2) = sl(F2, Fr).
Finally, the survival probability of any player at an ev missing is (2.6) s(F, -) = a4dF = EX4 = , say independently of the player strategy.
Assuming now that, given the probabilities si = s (Fr, F2), player 2 at a given encounter are independent random va both players survive a single encounter is, then, s5s2 and th survive the entire sequence of games is, therefore, oo q (2.7) pKq(SIS2)K= K=0 1-ss2 (Note that pKq is the probability of k e only player 1 will survive a single encou survive till the end of the sequence, the a probability s,(l -s2)/(1 -Ss2) that a dies. Employing the stationary proper survival probability of player 1 til opponent's death at one stage of the s oo q (2.8) S pKq K= q
The unconditioned survival probability of player 1
A strategy F is stable against expansion (of cooperative behavior) if for alm with F(a) < 1, A(a, F) _ 0. It is stable against desertion (from cooperative b for almost all a with F(a) > 0, A(a, F) -0. F is a Nash solution of the game if it i against both expansion and desertion. If it is strictly so, then r is a strict Nash and, therefore, an ESS. As an immediate result we get the following two propos We now prove the following result. Proposition 3.3. Any population Nash solution F of the game determines full cooperation over a non-degenerate subset of the prisoner's dilemma range D.
Proof. First, if F is a Nash solution then s = s,(F, F) > ., otherwise it follows from (2.10) that y/(F, F)< 0. But by unconditional defection, player 1 can guarantee s,l _ with y/ _ 0, in which case F cannot be a Nash solution. Now, from (3.5) it follows that on the boundary set (al a = a2 > a3 = a4} of D (a, r) = ps(s -/A)(a, -a3)> 0 and the continuity of A implies that A(a, r)> 0 for some open set in D. But from Proposition (3.1) it follows that F(a)= 1 for almost all a in this set, which completes the proof.
Proposition 3.4. If F is stable against expansion (desertion) then there is a Nash solution r' -r (F' _ r).
Proof. Assume F is stable against expansion. We define a decreasing set of strategies {rF}°_o0 which is stable against expansion in the following way:
(i) ro = r; (ii) Assume that rF has been defined so that it is stable against expansion. For any a EQ consider the game a in which each player attempts to maximize his gain, multiplied by 1-2ps, plus that of his opponent, multiplied by ps, (s,-), Sn = s(Fr, Fn).
In such a 2 X 2 game, the expected increment of the reward of a player switchi defection to cooperation, provided his opponent cooperates in probability F
(1 -;psn){(a, -a2)Fr(a) + (a3 -a4)(1 -Fn(a))} (3.5) + psn(s -I){(a, -a3)rT(a) + (a2 -a4)(1 -F(a))} = A(a, F) (see (3.5)). But since Fr is stable against expansion, we know that either Fn(a)= 1 or A(a, ,) < 0. In either case it follows from (3.5)' that a best strategy (probability of cooperation) x against F,(a) in the local game described above must be smaller than or equal to Fr(a) (in a non-singular case it is either x = FT(a) or x = 0).
As a general property of 2 X 2 symmetric games we know (e.g., Eshel (1982) ) that in this case there must be at least one ESS with cooperation probability smaller than or equal to Fr(a). We denote the smallest of these ESSs by F + ,(a). From the fact that the use of Fn +, against Fr +, is at least as good as the use of Fr against FT it follows that:
But since n + i(X) Fn,(X) for all X E Q, it follows from (2.1) and (3.1) that Sn + < By replacing s, by s,n+ we therefore only decrease the left side of (3.9). Employi (3.5) we get (3.10) A(Fn+, a) 0 for all a with n+i(a)< 1. F +, is therefore stable against expansion. {rnF }, is a decreasing sequence of non-negative functions, hence F By continuity argument, F' is also stable against expansion. It is st desertion from its very construction, so it is a Nash solution of the game (ii) There is a positive value x0 > 0 (including the possibility x0 = xo) (3.11) G= a <x4 =Gx, say.
a2 -a4
Proof. (i) Let F, and r2 be two Nash solutions of the supergame and let f min(rF, F2). s = s(r) < min(s(r,), s(r2)). Let a GE. Without loss of generality assum Fr(a) rF2(a) hence F(a) = Fr(a). Since Fr(a) is a Nash solution we know that either Fr(a) = 1 or A(a, Fr) -0 (F, is stable against expansion). But by differentiating the righ side of (3.5) with respect to s and employing (2.1), one can easily verify that it is increasing with s, as long as s > A. Hence, by replacing the term s(F,) in A(a, i,) by the equal or smaller term s(F) one gets A(a, f) and we get A(a, f) < A(a, F,) 0. f is, therefore, stable against expansion in a and this is true for all a E Q, hence f is stable against expansion.
From Proposition (3.4) it therefore follows that there is a Nash solution F3 r = min(Fr, F2). Now, for all x EQ, denote F*(x) = Inf{F(a) | F is a Nash solution}. Indeed, f* = G. Let F*(a) < 1. From the definition of F* it is implied that there is a sequence (F, } of Nash solutions such that F,(a) --*(a) as n -xc. We therefore conclude that there exists a decreasing sequence of Nash solutions (F,"* so that F* = F, and, for all n = 1, 2, ..., F*+, min{Fr*, r,+}.
Since {F,*} is a decreasing sequence of functions with F,* > F*, there exists a limit function F = lim F,* with F -F*. We also know F(a) = lim F *(a) = *(a).
n -oc
But for all n, F,* is a Nash solution and, therefore, stable against ex special case, it is stable against expansion at the point a. r*(a) < 1 and, large enough n. F*(a) < 1 and we know that A(a, F*) < 0. By continuit A(a, F) _ 0. But F(a) = F*(a) hence, by employing (3.5) we get 0 > A(a, F) = (1 -Aps)((a, -a2)F*(a) + (a3 -a4)(1 -F*(a))} (3.12) + ps(s -.){(a, -a3)*(a) + (a2 -a)(1 -F*(a where s = s(F). But F* _ F and, therefore, as we have seen, s* = s(T*) < replacing s by s* in the right side of(3.12) we obtain A(a, F*) _ 0. This is true for all a E Q with F*(a) < 1 and F* is, thus, stable against exp Proposition (3.4) we now deduce that there exists a Nash solution F** _ the definition of F*, F* F**, hence F** = F* is a Nash solution, and this proof of the first part of the proposition. Namely, there is a minimal Nas with (a I(a)> 0} = G. This, in turn, implies (3.13) a4-a3 b4-b3 ps(s -) a2-a4 b2-b4 1 -Aps (Note that from the definition of cooperation we have assumed (2.1), so that alway X2> X4, hence the denominators are positive.) Denote by F' the strategy obtained from r by determining F' = over an e-measure vicinity of a and F'= r elsewhere. For E > sufficiently small, the value s' = s(F') is sufficiently close to s so that it follows fro (3.13) that (3.14) X4-x >ps'(s'-A) X2 -X4 1 -pS' for all x at the e-vicinity of a. Moreover, since F' rF with strict inequality on a positive measure set then s' = s(F')< s() = s and (3.14) is indeed true for all x G. Assume now F'(x) > 0 we know that either F'(x) = F(x) = 1 or else (since F(x) > F'(x) > 0 and F is a Nash solution) A(x, F) < 0. But since s' _ s, A(x, F') A(x, F), hence A(x, F') 0 and F' is stable against expansion. It, therefore, follows from Proposition 3.4 that a Nash solution r" F' exists with F"(a) = 0 while F(a)> 0 contradiction to the assumption that r is a minimal Nash solution. We, thus, proved G = Gxo.
Finally, since Go = {a l a4 _ a3} contains no point of the prisoner's dilemma type, it follows from Proposition 3.3 that x0 > 0 and this completes the proof.
In a similar way, one can prove the following dual proposition.
Proposition 3.5'. There is a maximal Nash solution F and a positive value y > 0 such that (3.15) {a IF(a) = 1}=a a2a <o=H0, say, a I-a3 (the maximal range of full cooperation).
As it follows from Proposition 3.3 p(Hyo n D) > 0, i.e., Hy, includes a non-deg subset of the prisoner's dilemma range. As we see, however, it is possible that and full cooperation is a Nash solution.
The model of positive association
In many classes of human (and, maybe, animal) conflicts, the temptation to d higher when one's opponent defects, i.e.
(4.1) pX4-X3>X -X, = 1.
We refer to (4.1) as the assumption of positive manipulations, (4.1) can be written equivalently as,
XI -X3 X2-X4 with probability 1.
Henceforth, for any measurable set G C Q we denote by G the pure strategy F, r(x)= 1G. Proposition 4.1. In a model of positive association, the minimal Nash solution is the pure strategy G,o itself, namely: cooperate if and only if (a4-a3)/(a2 -a4) < X.
Proof. Let F be the minimal Nash solution. From Proposition 3.5 we know that (a I F(a) > 0} = Go. From the minimal property of F it also follows that (4~.~3) a4-a3<ps(s-A) a2-a4 -Aps for almost all a E G(o, otherwise we can build (in a similar way as Proposition 3.5) a strategy F' which is equal to F everywhere excep vicinity of the point a E Gxo which does not obey (4.3). We then define vicinity and show that for a small enough e > 0, F' is stable again therefore there is a Nash solution F" _ F' < F contrary to the minimal p Moreover, for any a E G it follows from (4.2) that either a2 -a, an --a3 <ps(s -A) (4.4a) a-a a-ps(sa,-a3 a2-a4 1 -.ps or (4.4b) a2< a, and a4< a3.
In both cases it follows from (3.8) that A-(a, that (for almost all aE G ) A+(a, F) _ 0, hence (4.5) A(a, F) > 0 for almost all a E G, (since F(a)> 0 on Gx).
From Proposition 3.1 we, thus, infer that F(a) = 1 for all a E G.o and the pure strategy G.o is, therefore, the minimal Nash solution.
We shall see that Go is also a strict Nash solution and an ESS. We prove more than this. Let us extend the definition of G.o so as to denote, for any x > 0: (4.6) G={a4 <x}. As a special case we know that the minimal Nash solution Gxo is an ESS. We also conclude that x0 is the smallest positive solution of g(x) = x.
We shall see now that the condition g(x) = x is sufficient but not necessary for Gx to be an ESS. But the boundary of G, is a compact set, hence, for X = x, (4.13) max a2al<g(
Both sides of (4.12) are continuous functions of 5, hence there is a value x2, x3 X2 > xl, such that (4.12) holds for all xl _< < 2 and it follows from (3.8) that A-(a, Ge) < 0 for all a E Ge. But since x _< _ x3, g( ) < ( and we also know that A +(a, Ge) < 0 for all a 4 Ge (Proposition 4.3). From Proposition 3.2 it, therefore, follows that Ge is an ESS.
Remarks. (i) Note that although the value x* itself is highly sensitive to minor changes in 'tail probabilities' ofF, the basic result is essentially robust in the sense that if full cooperation is the only ESS with the distribution F and if by minor tail-changes of F to F one increases the right side of (4. 11) from x* to x* (which may be much larger) then, by following the arguments of the proof one can readily verify that with F, any possible ESS (and there exists at least one) determines full cooperation except, maybe, to the event x* -e < x < *, which is rare even in terms of F.
(ii) Except for a singular case we know that either g(x)> x for all 0 -x <x* or g(x) <x for some 0 < x <x*.
In the singular case where g(x) > x for all 0 _ x <x* with equality holding on a discrete set of points xi, we know from Proposition 4.2 that Gx, is indeed an ESS (and even a strict Nash solution). Yet it is not the continuously stable property that, as we have suggested elsewhere (see Eshel (1983) , Eshel and Motro (1981) ) is more appropriate for population games with a non-discrete set of pure strategies. More specifically we know that if a large enough majority of the population plays exactly the strategy G, then it will be better off than any sufficiently small minority playing any other alternative strategy. However, for any e > 0 there are infinitely many pure strategies G which differ from Gx, on a set of measure less than e, so that if a large enough majority in the population will choose to play G, then it will be individually advantageous for any player to choose a strategy further off Gx, (i.e., different from GX, on a larger set). For example, for any xi <x <xi + 6 with 6 >0 sufficiently small we know that g(x)>x and, therefore, Gx is unstable with respect to expansion (it is stable with respect to desertion).
We may thus conclude the main findings of this section as follows.
Theorem. In a model of positive association, Q (i.e., unconditional cooperation) is either the only ESS (or at least, in a singular case, the only ESS which is continuously stable) or there is a continuity of ESSs G,, x,-< x2, all of which being continuously neutral to each other, and indeed, all determining full cooperation on a non-degenerated subset G,0 n D of encounters of the prisoner's dilemma type.
